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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
fllaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

RAYMOND RICK LYMAN,

:

IDefendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970738-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(l)(b) (1996). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Was it reasonable for the jury to infer from the totality of evidence,
including defendant's false statements to police, that he was the thief?
1. Was it reasonable for the jury to infer from the purchase price and date
of purchase that the fair market value of the stolen equipment exceeded $1,000.00
on the day of the theft? The standard of review for issues 1. and 2. is the same:

When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will]
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see also State v.
Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 [1996]. Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 [1996]. Theft - Classification of offenses . . .
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall
be punishable: . . .
(b) as a felony of the third degree if:
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000
but is less than $5,000 . . .
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is
or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is
less than $300. . . .

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
defendant was originally charged with one count of theft, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1996), and five counts of lewdness, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (1996) (R. 2-7).l He was
bound over on all six charges (R. 37).
His motion to quash the bind-over order (R. 65-316; see also R. 320-331) was
granted in part, and the five lewdness counts were dismissed without prejudice (R. 336342). The State thereafter filed an amended information alleging a single count of
third-degree felony theft (R. 348-349).2
Defendant was tried before a jury (R. 798-1338). At the close of the State's
case, he moved for a dismissal or directed verdict (R. 1212-1216) which the trial court
denied (R. 1214, 1216).
The jury convicted defendant of third-degree felony theft (R. 665-666). The
trial court denied defendant's motion to arrest judgment (R. 763-769; see R. 704-720,
745-750. 758-762; see also R. 724-725, 731-742), and sentenced defendant to zero-tofive years in prison and a $5,000.00 fine and 85% surcharge (R. 785-790).

| Pages in the two "pleadings folders" are numbered sequentially back to front.
Pages 365-586 are preliminary hearing and pretrial hearing transcripts that were not,
apparently, forwarded with the record and are not, in any event, pertinent to
defendant's appeal.
2,1

The State also refiled the lewdness counts, and trial is pending.
3

Defendant's prison term and fine were stayed and he was placed on probation for three
years. IcL Terms of his probation included serving 30 days in the county jail, payment
of a $2,000 fine, and payment of restitution in the amount of $1,257.73. Id.
Defendant timely appealed (R. 791-792).
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Background. Because of reports that someone was looking through a hole in a
utility closet at female patrons in a fitness center tanning room, police installed
surveillance equipment in the closet. The next day, the surveillance equipment was
stolen, and was never recovered.
Defendant and his wife are co-owners, with another couple, of the Lifephase
Fitness Center (LFC) in Cedar City, Utah (R. 987-988, 1004-1005, 1218, 1236-1237).
Defendant, a dentist practicing in Blanding, Utah, traveled to Cedar City on
Wednesday nights to work at the LFC through Saturday nights (R. 1221-1222; see also
R. 939, 960-961, 978, 1039, 1156). According to his wife, defendant was primarily
responsible for regular maintenance at the center, including spackling work and the
monthly maintenance of the furnace and sump pump in the basement utility closet4 (R.
1220-1221, 1223, 1237; see R. 998). Indeed, of the co-owners, defendant was the one
3

The evidence and all reasonable inferences are recited in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992)
(citations omitted)
4

The utility closet is also referred to by witnesses as the "maintenance room."
4

who used the utility closet the most and was most familiar with its contents (R. 12641265). Defendant was also the only person seen in the utility closet on the day of the
theft (R, 1191-1193, 1204).
$ispicious hole between utility closet and tanning room. In late March or early
April 1996, an LFC employee noticed a 2- to 2 ^-inch-long by 1/4- to 1/2-inch-wide
hole under an electrical outlet in the tanning room that went through the wall into the
adjoining utility closet (R. 934-936, 947-950, 992; cL R. 1083, 1110-1111). She told a
coworker about the hole, and also told an LFC member who was a police officer. Id^
The police officer informed another LFC member, Paula Douglas, who regularly used
the tanning room and who worked as a secretary at the Cedar City Police Department
(CCPD) (R. 1036-1037).5 At work the following morning, she reported the
information to a police detective (R. 1037). An anonymous caller had already phoned
the detective with concerns that someone at the fitness center was looking through the
hole at female patrons in the tanning room (R. 1106).
The police detective then contacted Steve Brown, co-owner of the LFC, and
visited the LFC's basement utility closet (R. 989-990, 1107-1108). The detective
determined that looking through the hole a person in the utility closet could see right
into the tanning bed in the tanning room since there was no insulation in that portion of

5

Shortly before trial, Paula married the police detective who was assigned to and
testified in this case (R. 1035-1036, 1059-1061).
5

the wall (R. 1109-1112, 1129). Police decided to install surveillance equipment to see
who was looking through the hole (R. I l l 1-1112), and co-owner Steve Brown gave his
permission (R. 992-993). The Browns left that day to visit family in Provo for the
Easter weekend and did not return to Cedar City until Sunday night (R. 993-994).
Defendant's wife also left town that day to visit family in Logan, and she returned late
Monday night (R. 1253-1255).
Friday night: police install surveillance equipment. Late Friday night, 5 April
1996, after the LFC had closed, police installed surveillance equipment in the utility
closet (R. 1069, 1081-1082, 1106-1120). They hid a small pinhole video camera, a
small monitor, a VCR, a breakout box, power adapters, cords, and cables behind the
furnace, the two water heaters, and the sump pump (R. 1068-1082, 1099-1100, 11111120, 1148, 1157-1158; State's Exhibits P-1 and P-5). Police also used loose pieces of
sheetrock and carpet remnants to conceal the equipment. IcL Someone who simply
opened the door and turned on the light or was unfamiliar with the room would not
have noticed the concealed equipment (R. 1096, 1100-1102, 1113-1114, 1117-1119).
Saturday at the LFC. Saturdays are not usually very busy at the LFC (see R.
979-980), and, because this was Easter weekend, only a small number of patrons used
the fitness center on this particular Saturday (R. 1040-1042, 1050-1056, 1144, 1154,
1183-1186, 1206).

6

dn Saturday morning, between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m., a female aerobics instructor
was the first person to enter the LFC, locked the front door behind her, and worked out
on equipment in the "cardio" room for about half an hour (R. 954-955).
Knowing the LFC opened at 9:00 a.m., the police detective arrived at about 8:30
a.m., entered through the front door with a key provided by Steve Brown, went
directly to the utility closet, turned on the power strip to the surveillance equipment,
pushed the "record" button on the VCR, heard (but did not see) someone working out
in the "cardio" room, and left (R. 1119-1122). There was only one car in the parking
lot when the detective departed (R. 1121).
Sfcme time later, defendant arrived at the LFC. Defendant found the aerobics
instructor and asked her to teach a class from 9:00 until 10:30 a.m. (R. 955-956). His
brother-in-law who did odd jobs, college student Chris Delahunty, reached defendant
by phone at the LFC to tell him he would be coming in to repair some carpet seams
they had talked about (R. 1179-1180).
(Jhris arrived at the LFC sometime between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. (R. 1181-1182).
He found defendant in the downstairs hallway near the tanning room (R. 1183-1187).
Chris could see from under the tanning room door that the light was on (R. 1204).
Defendant showed Chris the carpet seams that needed to be repaired downstairs and
suggested that Chris use carpet remnants to repair them (R. 1180-1181, 1187-1188).
Then defendant showed Chris the carpet seams that needed to be repaired in the
7

aerobics room upstairs (R. 1188). Chris got his tools and began fixing the carpet seams
downstairs (R. 1188-1189). Some time later, he spoke with defendant who was
standing in the open doorway to the utility closet (R. 1190-1193, 1204, 1207-1209).
While they talked, defendant went into the utility closet, appeared to look at the shelf
and do some work with the door open, then came back out and closed the door. IdL
Chris saw defendant off and on as he worked (R. 1188-1189).
Around this time, a personal trainer arrived and began working with individual
patrons in the weight room downstairs (R. 967-973). He remembers seeing the
aerobics instructor teaching a class that morning, and seeing Chris working on carpet
seams in the aerobics room later on (R. 970-974). Although he saw defendant at the
front desk when he arrived (R. 969), he did not see defendant while working with
patrons in the weight room (R. 970-971).
Female patron arranges with defendant to use tanning room. At about 9:30
a.m., Paula Douglas, the CCPD secretary, arrived for her regular workout (R. 1040).
Defendant was at the front desk. IcL Paula saw Chris on his knees fixing carpet in the
hallway when she went downstairs to the weight room (R. 1041). Paula worked out in
the weight room for about 30 minutes. Id,. Then she went back to the front desk,
where she waited 2 to 3 minutes until defendant came up the front stairs (R. 10421044). She asked defendant how many tans she had left on her "tanning card," then
went downstairs to the tanning room (R. 1043-1044).
8

Paula regularly used the tanning room on Saturdays (R. 1038, 1044), had agreed
with police to use the tanning room as normal on this particular Saturday (R. 1038),
and knew that police had put surveillance equipment in the adjoining utility closet (R.
1039).
Noise from the utility closet. Paula undressed, turned on the radio and fan, set
the timer for 20 minutes, and got into the tanning bed (R. 1044-1047). About midway
through her tanning session, she heard what she thought was a crash or a bang coming
through the wall from the utility closet (R. 1045, 1061-1065). Paula finished her
tanning session, dressed, and walked through the LFC to try to locate defendant (R.
1046-1047). When she went outside, she noticed that defendant's truck, which she had
seen in the parking lot when she arrived, was gone (R. 1048-1050).
The aerobics instructor finished her class at about 10:30 a.m., changed her
clothes, and went home (R. 957-958). She does not remember seeing defendant after
her class. kL After she left, Chris began repairing carpet seams in the aerobics room
(R. 1193-1194).
Paula went back inside, worked out in the "cardio" room for about 30 minutes,
and walked through the LFC again looking for defendant (R. 1054-1056). When she
left at about 11:00 a.m., defendant's truck was not in the parking lot (R. 1056-1057).
Defendant does some spackling. Some time after 11:00 a.m., defendant went
into the aerobics room carrying a bucket of sheetrock compound, and asked Chris if he
9

could borrow his spackling knife (R. 1194-1195). About 15 minutes later, defendant
came back to the aerobics room and returned Chris's spackling knife (R. 1195-1196;
1206). A short time later, defendant returned again, said he was going to be gone for
30 minutes, and asked Chris to watch the front desk (R. 1196-1197; 1201-1202).
Shortly after defendant left, Chris's wife and young son arrived at the LFC and
visited with him as he continued working on the carpet in the aerobics room (R. 11681170). While she was there, defendant walked in and told Chris, "I'm back" (R. 11691173, 1198-1199). Chris only had to help one customer while defendant was gone (R.
1206).
Detective returns, surveillance equipment is missing. At about 7:00 p.m. (an
hour after closing), the police detective returned to the LFC, went to the utility closet,
and discovered that all of the surveillance equipment was missing (R. 1121-1123). The
detective then called the officer from whom he had obtained the equipment, his own
supervisor, and the chief of police (1122-1124). After some discussion, they decided
the detective should question defendant. IcL
The plainclothes detective and a uniformed officer arrived at defendant's house
between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. (R. 1123-1124, 1160). Defendant answered the door.
The officers told him about the hole in the wall between the utility closet
and the tanning room, and that surveillance equipment police had put in the utility
closet the night before was now missing (R. 1124-1125, 1156-1157, 1161-1163).
10

Defendant's denials. Defendant immediately and repeatedly denied going into
the utility closet at any time that day, and denied knowledge of any hole (R. 1125-1126,
1156-1157, 1162). He also denied ever leaving the LFC while working that day. IcL
Later, after the detective made a phone call, defendant admitted leaving the LFC
several times, but continued to deny being in the utility closet (R. 1125-1126, 11621164).6 Defendant consented to a search of his home and truck, but the detective and
the uniformed officer found nothing (R. 1126, 1164-1165).
"Why would a thief do repair work on a hole?" The police detective returned to
the LFC at about 10:30 p.m. to look for any evidence that would identify the thief (R.
1126-1128). He and another officer searched every room in the fitness center, but
could not locate the equipment (R. 1133-1134). However, the detective discovered that
the hole between the utility closet and the tanning room had been spackled with
sheetrock compound that was still damp to the touch (R. 1128-1129). He also
discovered a bucket in the utility closet which contained sheetrock compound that was
still damp. IcL The police detective also found that the hole on the tanning room side
6

Although his trial counsel conceded in closing argument that Chris did see
defendant in the utility closet (R. 1308-1309), counsel tried to mitigate defendant's
denials by arguing that defendant was only in the closet "briefly" (R. 1308-1309,
1311). Nevertheless, defendant omitted from his marshaling the fact that he was the
only person seen in the utility closet by a witness the day of the theft, and that his
presence there contradicted his denials to police (see Def. Br. at 2-9). When a
defendant fails to marshal evidence in support of the verdict, this Court will decline to
consider an insufficiency claim. State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53, n.l (Utah App.
1996) (citing State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)).
11

had been spackled (R. 1130-1131). A criminalist arrived a short time later and took
photographs of the spackled hole under the outlet in the tanning room (R. 1027-1033,
1127-1128; State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3, addendum A). LFC co-owner, Steve
Brown, had not asked anyone to spackle the hole and did not know who had done the
work (R. 998). Handyman Chris Delahunty, who repaired carpet at the LFC on
Saturday, did not do any spackling work that day (R. 1175-1210).
Getting out without being seen. No one saw defendant or anyone else leave the
LFC through the front door with the equipment (R. 941, 958-960, 963, 971, 973, 986),
but, according to co-owner Brown, someone familiar with the building could exit
without being seen (R. 1001-1003). In addition to the main staircase near the front
lobby (see R. 1040-1041, 1183-1184), there is a staircase in the "cardio" room (see R.
1042-1043, 1046, 1185-1186), and there are two back door exits on the main floor that
lead to the parking lot and that could be opened from the inside without a key (R. 9991000, 1018-1019, 1199). In addition, defendant generally had a duffel bag with him,
including on Saturdays (R. 1181). The equipment that was stolen would fit in a duffel
bag (R. 1098-1100). People who knew defendant would not think it odd to see him
leave the LFC with the duffel bag (R. 1181-1182; see also R. 1193; cf R. 1201).
Defendant's wife's testimony. Defendant's wife was the sole witness for the
defense. She testified that she never saw a hole in the tanning room before the day of
the theft, even though she used the tanning room 2-3 times a week, and that, if there
12

were a hole, she would have noticed it and fixed it (R. 1256). Her testimony that there
was no hole was contradicted by the testimony of five other eyewitnesses (R. 934-927,
948-949, 991-992, 1083-1084, 1109-1111).
Defendant's wife also testified that, a week after this incident, she went to the
utility closet to search for a hole, took the plates off both outlets, spackled around every
corner, and put them back on (R. 1258). She further testified that a hole later
"reappeared," and she did the same thing (R. 1258-1259). After viewing the
photographs taken the day of the incident, she initially suggested that they depicted her
repairs (R. 1259; see State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3). In one of the photos, the
criminalist had put a ruler on which he had handwritten and initialed the date the photo
was taken: "4-6-96 CCP" ("CCP" was for "Cedar City Police," the agency requesting
the photo, R. 1030). Defendant's wife eventually conceded that, if a hole under the
outlet was repaired on 6 April 1996, she did not know who repaired it (R. 1259-1260).7

7

Defendant omitted his wife's testimony from his Statement of Facts (Def. Br.
at 2-9). See n.6, above.
13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The jury's verdict was based on reasonable inferences drawn from the
totality of evidence including defendant's false statements to police, and was not based
on speculation and conjecture. Defendant has failed to establish that the evidence and
inferences that may reasonably be drawn are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.
Because of reports that someone was looking through a hole in the utility closet
at female patrons in the LFC tanning room, police installed surveillance equipment in
the closet. The next morning, a female patron arranged with defendant to use the
tanning room. While she was in the tanning bed she heard a noise from the utility
closet. After she left the fitness center, defendant was seen with a bucket of sheetrock
compound and borrowed a spackling knife. Later that day, after discovering that their
surveillance equipment was missing, police found a bucket of still-damp sheetrock
compound in the utility closet and discovered that the hole between the two rooms had
been spackled shut.
When questioned by police on the evening of the theft, defendant denied
knowing anything about a hole in the wall and repeatedly denied that he had been in the
utility closet. But defendant was the only person seen in the utility closet on the day of
the theft, and compelling circumstantial evidence establish that he repaired the hole.
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Defendant also initially denied that he had ever left the fitness center that day. But he
later admitted, and eyewitnesses testified, that he was gone at least twice. He therefore
had the ability to obtain the sheetrock compound for the repair, and to dispose of the
stolen equipment which was never found. In sum, reasonable inferences from the
totality of evidence establish that defendant was the thief.
Point II. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the fair
market value of the items stolen exceeded $1,000.00 on the day of the theft. Although
there was no direct evidence as to the fair market value of the surveillance equipment
on the day it was stolen, there was undisputed evidence that its total purchase price was
$1,257.73. Since nine of the ten items were purchased within five months of the theft,
the jury could reasonably infer that the fair market value of the equipment exceeded the
statutory minimum on the day of the theft.
ARGUMENT
Point I
REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THE TOTALITY OF
EVIDENCE ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE THIEF
Defendant asserts that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish
his guilt, and that the jury's verdict must have been based on speculation and conjecture
(Def. Br. at 9-15). On the contrary, the jury's verdict was based on reasonable
inferences drawn from the totality of evidence including defendant's false statements to
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police. Defendant has therefore failed to establish that, viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be
drawn from it are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. See Hamilton. 827
P.2dat235.
It is well settled that a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone.
See State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997); State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123,
126-127 (Utah 1986); State v. Rebeterano. 681 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1984); State v.
Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983); State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah
App.), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Barlow. 851 P.2d 1191, 1193
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). However, when a conviction is
based solely on circumstantial evidence, a reviewing court must determine
(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of
the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from
that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience
sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
guilt.
Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)).
The elements for third-degree felony theft are:
1. That the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally;
2. That the defendant did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof;
16

3. That the property had a value in excess of $1,000;8 and
4. That the offense, if any, occurred on or about April 6, 1996, in Iron County,
State of Utah.
(see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1996); cf elements instruction R. 655, 1271).
Defendant focuses his insufficiency argument on element 2. listed above:
although he concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish a theft, he argues that
it was insufficient to establish that he was the thief (see Def. Br. at 11; R. 1306-1307).
Defendant specifically argues that the jury had to "leap across an evidentiary
gap" in order to conclude that he was the one who repaired the hole between the rooms
just because he was seen with sheetrock compound and borrowed a spackling knife on
the day the hole was repaired (Def. Br. at 12). And even if it's true he repaired the
hole, defendant argues, such an action by a business owner "is at least as consistent
with lawful conduct as with criminal conduct" (Def Br. at 12-13, quoting R. 338).
Defendant also argues that the jury had to "necessarily and impermissibly leap
across an even bigger evidentiary gap in order to conclude that the person who spackled
the slit was the same person who stole the surveillance equipment, and that Defendant
was that person," and that such a conclusion could be based only on speculation and
conjecture (Def. Br. at 13).

Defendant contests the sufficiency of evidence on this element under Point II in
his brief (Def. Br. at 15-18). He does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence under
elements 1. or 4.
17

On the contrary, reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the totality of the
evidence, including defendant's false statements to police on the day of the theft (which
defendant omitted from his Statement of Facts, see n.6 above), establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was the thief.
A. Reasonable inferences from the totality of evidence implicate defendant
Since no one saw defendant steal the equipment, and since the equipment was
never found, the jury's guilty verdict had to be based on reasonable inferences from the
evidence. "A jury may choose which, among several reasonable inferences, to
believe." Brown. 948 P.2d at 345 (quoting Workman. 852 P.2d at 987; but see I.C.,
below). In reviewing the totality of evidence, the following inferences have a "basis in
logic and reasonable human experience" (Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d at 985)):
1. The thief had at most a 10 Vi hour window of opportunity. The police
detective turned on the power strip to the equipment and pushed the
"record" button at approximately 8:30 a.m., and he discovered the
equipment was missing when he returned at 7:00 p.m. that night (R.
1119-1123). Therefore, the police surveillance equipment was stolen
from the LFC between 8:30 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, 6 April
1996. (Although it was not a busy day at the fitness center, several
people, including defendant, had access to the unlocked utility closet and
could have stolen the equipment. But a thief other than defendant would
have had even less time to take the equipment without being detected,
since defendant was in and out of the utility room himself at least twice
that day (see B.l. and 2., below).)
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2. The thief had to be familiar with the utility closet. Police who
installed and concealed the equipment testified that it would not have been
visible to someone who was not familiar with the closet or its contents or
who entered for the first time (R. 1096, 1100-1102, 1113-1114, 11171119). (Witness testimony was undisputed that defendant was the person
who used the utility closet the most and was most familiar with its
contents (R. 1220-1221, 1223, 1237, 1264-1265), and he was the only
person seen by a witness in the utility closet on the day of the theft (R.
1191-1193).)
3. The thief had to move things to discover the concealed surveillance
equipment. Even if the thief was familiar with the contents of the utility
closet, because the equipment was well-concealed, the thief would have
had to move carpet remnants and sheetrock scraps out of the way to
discover it (R. 1096, 1100-1103, 1113-1114, 1117-1119, 1148, 11571158). Hence, the thief had to have had a reason to move things.
(Defendant's brother-in-law called defendant at the LFC Saturday
morning to ask about doing carpet seam repairs (R. 1179-1180).
Defendant suggested Chris use carpet remnants to do some of the repairs
(R. 1180-1181, 1187). When Chris arrived, he spoke with defendant who
was standing in the open utility closet doorway (R. 1190-1193).
Defendant could have discovered the concealed equipment while looking
for a piece of carpet (see R. 1119).)
4. The thief may have been in the utility closet while a female patron was
tanning in the adjoining room. A female patron heard a loud crash or
bang coming from the utility closet while she was tanning (R. 1045, 10611065). It is reasonable to conclude that the noise was caused by someone
in the closet. (The female patron had asked defendant at the front desk
about tanning before she went to the tanning room, so defendant knew
that she was going there (R. 1042-1044).)
5. The thief s motive for taking the surveillance equipment may have
been to avoid being detected looking through the hole at a female patron
in the tanning room. The existence and location of a VCR in a utility
closet connected to a video camera aimed at a hole in the wall through
which someone could look into the tanning room would lead any person
who discovered the equipment to conclude its purpose (see R. 1069,
1081-1082, 1106-1120; State's Exhibit P-5). Hence, the thief s motive
19

may have been to avoid being detected looking through the hole.
(Defendant regularly worked in the utility closet adjacent to the tanning
room(R. 1220-1221, 1223, 1237, 1264-1265). If he had been looking
through the hole at naked women, he would have had a motive to remove
the equipment to avoid detection.)
6. Only a thief who wanted to avoid further suspicion for looking through
the hole would have taken the time to spackle it shut. After discovering
the theft, the police detective observed that the hole between the utility
closet and tanning room had been spackled shut, and that the repairs were
still damp. He also found a bucket in the utility closet that contained
sheetrock compound that was still damp (R. 1128-1131). Therefore, the
hole was repaired on the day of the theft. (Defendant was carrying a
bucket of sheetrock compound and borrowed a spackling knife just before
noon on the day of the theft (R. 1194-1196; 1206). All the other fitness
center owners were out of town (R. 993-994, 1253-1255), and the only
other person doing maintenance work at the center was repairing carpets,
not spackling walls (R. 1175-1210). Defendant was in the utility closet
more than anyone else (see 2., above). Therefore, his motive to repair
the hole could have been to avoid further suspicion that he was looking
through it.)
7. The thief had to leave the fitness center to dispose of the stolen
equipment which was never found. After discovering their equipment
missing, police searched every room of the fitness center but never found
it (R. 1133-1134). No one saw the thief leave with the equipment (R.
941, 958-960, 963, 971, 973, 986). Therefore, the thief removed the
equipment from the fitness center without being detected. (As a coowner, defendant was aware of a back stairway and two rear exits from
the fitness center (see R. 999-1000, 1018-1019, 1042-1043, 1046, 11851186, 1199). Removing the equipment in the duffel bag defendant
regularly had with him at the center would not have aroused suspicion (R.
1098-1100, 1181-1182). Defendant initially denied to police that he had
left the LFC the day of the theft, although he later admitted leaving
several times (R. 1125-1126, 1156-1157, 1162-1164). Eyewitnesses
testified that defendant left and returned to the LFC at least twice (R.
1048-1050, 1056-1057; 1196-1197, 1201-1202; 1169-1173, 1198-1199).
He first departed, apparently without telling anyone, shortly after a female
patron in the tanning bed heard a loud noise in the adjoining utility closet
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(see R. 1045, 1061-1065). Defendant's truck was gone when she
concluded her tanning session and was still gone when she left the LFC
herself about a half an hour later (R. 1048-1050, 1056-1057). When
defendant returned to the LFC, he was carrying a bucket of sheetrock
compound (R. 1194-1195). About a half hour later, he departed again
after asking someone to cover the front desk in his absence (R. 11961197; 1201-1202; 1169-1173, 1198-1199). During this absence defendant
could easily have disposed of the surveillance equipment which was never
found.)
All these inferences, with a "basis in logic and reasonable human experience,"
implicate defendant. But the inferences to be drawn from his false statements to police
on the day of the theft are even more incriminating.
B. Defendant's false statements are incriminating and further establish that he
was the thief
False or misleading statements are incriminating. See State v. Smith, 726 P.2d
1232, 1234-1235 (Utah 1986) (corroborating circumstances for proof of larceny include
acts, conduct, falsehoods, or other declarations that tend to show guilt); MeCormick's
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 271 (2d ed. 1972) (false statements "constitute]
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt"); see also Stafford v. People, 154
Colo. 113, 388 P.2d 774, 778 (1964) (en banc ) (fact that defendant repeatedly lied
about his wife's disappearance was properly submitted to the jury as evidence of guilt
and consciousness of guilt). Therefore, when added to the inferences implicating him,
defendant's disproved denials to police help establish that he was the thief.
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In response to questioning by police on the evening after the theft, and after they
told him about the missing equipment and the hole between the utility closet and
tanning room, defendant repeatedly denied ever being in the utility closet that day and
denied knowing about the hole (R. 1125-1126, 1156-1157, 1162).
1. Defendant was in the utility closet. Defendant's repeated denials that he was
ever in the utility closet on the day of the theft were directly contradicted by the
testimony of his brother-in-law, handyman Chris Delahunty. Chris testified that he
spoke with defendant the morning of the theft near the open door of the utility closet,
and that, while they talked, defendant entered the utility closet, looked at a shelf and
worked in the closet with the door open, then came back out, and closed the door (R.
1181-1193, 1204, 1208-1209; see n.6, above).
In addition to Chris's eyewitness testimony, strong circumstantial evidence
suggests that defendant was also in the utility closet when the female patron in the
tanning room heard a noise coming from the closet (see R. 1043-1047, 1061, 1065).
2. Defendant knew about the hole. Eyewitness testimony and compelling
circumstantial evidence establish that defendant had also been in the utility closet on the
day of the theft to repair the hole. Indeed, his repair of the hole conclusively
establishes that he knew about it.
Shortly after the female patron departed the fitness center, defendant was
carrying a bucket of sheetrock compound and asking if he could borrow his brother-in22

law's spackling knife (R. 1194-1195). The hole between the utility closet and the
tanning room were spackled shut some time that day, and a bucket of still-damp
sheetrock compound was found in the utility closet later that night (R. 1128-1131).
Photographs of the spackled hole taken later that day were also admitted against
defendant (R. 1027-1033, 1127-1128; State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3).
If defendant had innocently patched the hole, unaware of the surveillance
equipment in the utility closet, it would have been unreasonable for him to repeatedly
deny ever being in the utility closet on the day the hole was patched and the equipment
stolen. Instead, it is more reasonable to infer that defendant left the LFC shortly after
the noise he made in the utility closet alerted the female patron in the tanning room,
that he obtained sheetrock compound, returned, patched the hole, and left the bucket in
the utility closet when he was through. And it is also reasonable to infer that he later
lied to police about being in the utility closet and knowing about the hole because he
did not want to be identified as the thief or "peeping-Tom."
In sum, reasonable inferences from the evidence, including his false statements
to police, establish that defendant was the thief of the surveillance equipment.
C. Defendant has provided no reasonable alternative hypothesis
Defendant argues that when a verdict is based entirely on circumstantial
evidence, that evidence "must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's
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innocence so as to leave only one reasonable conclusion, that of guilt" (Def. Br. at 10,
citing State v. John. 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978)).
Although recently revived by two members of this Court in State v. Layman.
335 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah App. January 29, 1998) (Greenwood, J., and Orme, J.;
Bench, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), petition for cert, filed. (Utah
March 20, 1998) (No. 980150), this proposition is contrary to the weight of recent
Utah Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals authority.
The two most recent Utah Supreme Court decisions addressing convictions based
solely on circumstantial evidence do not even mention "reasonable alternative
hypothesis." See State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997), and State v.
Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). Both opinions hold instead that when a
prosecution is based solely on circumstantial evidence, "the role of the reviewing court
is to determine (1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element
of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each
legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.; see also State v.
Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah App.) ("The existence of one or more alternate
reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah
1996).
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Prior supreme court decisions hold that discussions about a "reasonable
alternative hypothesis" are simply one way of restating the State's trial burden, i.e.,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 236 n. 1; State v. McClain.
706 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985); State v. Eagle. 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980).9
But the general standard of appellate review for insufficiency claims still applies. See.
e.g.. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 236 n.l; State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1993)
(applying the general standard of review to a circumstantial evidence case); State v.
James. 819 P.2d 781, 784, 789-793 (Utah 1991); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 124
(Utah 1989); State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. Watts. 675 P.2d
566, 568 (Utah 1983).
Defendant's assertion that the State must disprove every "reasonable alternative
hypothesis" is also contradicted by recent Tenth Circuit cases. See United States v.
Mains. 33 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Although it is possible to hypothesize
from circumstantial evidence that another individual may have possessed the [drugs]. . .
the evidence required to support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other

9

Indeed, no "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction need be given where
"the jury is instructed that the State must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hansen. 710
P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. McClain. 706 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985);
State v. Burton. 642 P.2d 716, 719 (Utah 1982)); cf R. 656-658.
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reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt") (quoting
United States v. Parrish. 925 F.2d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 1991)).
In sum, the proposition that the State must disprove every reasonable alternative
hypothesis excluding guilt is contrary to the weight of controlling authority. In any
event, defendant has proposed no alternative hypothesis that is reasonable.
1. The explicit alternative hypothesis presented through his only witness was
completely discredited. Defendant's wife was his sole witness. She testified that she
saw no hole in the wall until after the theft, that she spackled around the outlets a week
later, and that a hole appeared after that which she again spackled (R. 1256, 12581260).
Her testimony was completely discredited. Five eyewitnesses saw the hole
before the theft, including the two police who aimed their camera at it (R. 924-927,
948-949, 991-992, 1083-1084, 1109-1111). Likewise, photograph's taken the day of
the theft rebutted her suggestion that she was the one who had spackled the hole a week
later (R. 1259; State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3). Indeed, she eventually conceded that she
did not know who repaired the hole on the day of the theft (R. 1259-1260).
By their verdict, it is obvious the jury rejected the testimony of defendant's wife.
Credibility determinations are left to the trier of fact. State v. Stringham. No. 960426CA, slip op. at 14 (Utah App. April 23, 1998) ("We will not disturb the jury's
credibility determinations") (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)).
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2. Defendant's alternative "phantom thief and hole-spackler" hypothesis is
unreasonable. Defendant also suggested a more general alternative hypothesis: that
some unknown person entered the fitness center, walked past the front desk, went
downstairs, entered the utility room, managed to discover the concealed surveillance
equipment, and stole it, and that the thief (or some other unknown person) also went
into the utility closet and tanning room, discovered the hole, and then spackled it shut
(seeR. 1305-1316).
While such a scenario is certainly possible, it defies "logic and reasonable
human experience" (see Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting Workman. 852 P.2d at
985)). Based on all the evidence, it is unreasonable to infer that an erstwhile thief,
looking for something to steal, somehow wandered into the fitness center utility closet
on a quiet Saturday, discovered the concealed surveillance equipment, decided to steal
it, disconnected it, and then made off with it undetected. It is even less reasonable to
infer that, on the very same day defendant was seen with sheetrock compound, an
opportunistic thief (or anyone else besides defendant) patched the hole between the
utility closet and tanning room.
Based on the totality of evidence, defendant's alternative hypotheses are
unreasonable. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish that the evidence and all
reasonable inferences are so inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable
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minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he was the thief. See Hamilton.
827 P.2d at 235; see also R. 656.
Point II
THE JURY COULD REASONABLY INFER FROM PURCHASE
PRICE AND DATE OF PURCHASE EVIDENCE THAT THE FAIR
MARKET VALUE OF THE STOLEN EQUIPMENT EXCEEDED
$1000.00 ON THE DAY OF THE THEFT
Defendant argues that there "was no evidence whatsoever that the fair market
value of the items exceeded $1,000.00" on the day of the theft (Def Br. at 15).
Although there was no direct evidence as to fair market value, there was specific
evidence about when the surveillance equipment was purchased and its purchase price.
Since nine of the ten pieces of equipment were purchased within five months of the
theft, the jury could reasonably infer that its fair market value exceeded the statutory
minimum on the day of the theft.
"Fair market value of the goods stolen in the area where the theft occurred is the
standard for valuing property in theft cases. Fair market value has been defined as
'what the owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer would pay to
the true owner for the stolen item.'" State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah 1985)
(quoting State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977)); cf R. 651.
Although a Utah court has not yet addressed the issue, other state courts have
held that a jury may reasonably infer fair market value from the property's purchase
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price, particularly if the property is relatively new. See Bailey County Appraisal
District v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex.App. 1993) (jury may infer fair
market value from property's purchase price); Dawson v. State, 360 So.2d 57, 58 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (jury may infer fair market value from purchase price and other
circumstances); Marini v. State, 30 Md.App. 19, 351 A.2d 463, 469-470 (Md. 1976)
(jury may infer fair market value from evidence of original purchase price 10 years
before, replacement value to owner, and cost of tires recently placed on the car);
People v. Paris, 182 Colo. 148, 151, 511 P.2d 893, 894 (Colo. 1973) (jury may infer
fair market value from testimony by owner of original purchase price where goods are
so new that purchase price and fair market value are comparable).
The table on the following page reflects the purchase price and date of purchase
for each of the stolen items, with supporting citations from the record.
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Item
number
(Exfa^P-1)

Description of item

Purchase
price

Date of
purchase u

Proof

1

Pinhole camera

$298.33

12/1/95

R. 1070; Exh.D-6,12
pages 1-4

2

Variable focus lens

$198.46

12/1/95

R. 1071; Exh. D-6,
pages 1-4

3

Small monitor

$289.54

12/1/95

R. 1071; Exh. D-6,
pages 1-4

4

Universal cable

$13.33

12/3/95

R. 1071-1072;
Exh. D-6, pages 1-4

5

Power adapter

$43.50

12/1/95

R. 1072; Exh. D-6,
pages 1-4

6

Power adapter

$46.15

12/1/95

R. 1072; Exh. D-6,
pages 1-4

7

Common power strip

$25.00

12/13/95

R. 1072-1073; Exh. D6, page 7, check # 6413

8

VCR/recorder

$288.00

1/18/89

R. 1073; Exh. D-6,
pages 8-11

9

Breakout box

$40.92

12/13/95

R. 1073; Exh. D-6,
pages 5-7, check # 6414

12/13/95

R. 1073-1074;
Exh. D-6, pages 5-7,
check # 6414

10

Two video cables

$14.50

The total purchase price for all of the equipment was $1,257.73.

10

Exhibit P-l is in addendum B.

11

"Date of purchase" is based on evidence of actual payment (see Proof), not
the date the item was ordered (see Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-106(l) and 70A-2-401
(1997)); cf Def. Br. at 6.
12

Exhibit D-6 is in addendum C.
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In order to convict defendant of third-degree felony theft, the jury had to find
that the fair market value of the equipment exceeded $1,000.00 on 6 April 1996, the
day of the theft (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b)(i) (1996)). Aside from the
VCR, which was purchased seven years before, all of the other equipment was
purchased within five months of the theft. In order to conclude that its fair market
value was over $1,000.00 on 6 April 1996, the jury must have concluded that the
equipment, as a whole, had not depreciated more than $257.72 (or just over 20%).
Even if the jury found that the seven year-old VCR was worth only $100.00 on the day
of the theft, that would still leave $157.72 of depreciation (or nearly 13%) for the other
nine items which were less than five months old. Hence, based on the evidence of date
of purchase and purchase price, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the fair
market value of all the equipment exceeded $1,000.00 on the day of the theft. See
Bailey County, 848 S.W.2d at 825; Dawson. 360 So.2d at 58; Marini. 351 A.2d at
469-470; and Pans, 511 P.2d at 894.
The jury was instructed on a lesser-included offense based on a lower value
element (R. 641, 654), but convicted defendant as charged (R. 655-656). Their verdict
was based on reasonable inferences from the evidence and should not be disturbed.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this A-iU day of May, 1998.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
State's Exhibits P-2 and P-3:
Photographs of hole repair under the outlet
in the tanning room of Lifephase Fitness Center
taken the day of the theft (P-3: "4-6-96")

STATE'S EXHIBIT

STATE'S

FYTTTTtTT

P-2

V-1

Addendum B
State's Exhibit P-l:
Diagram of surveillance equipment installed in the
utility closet at the Lifephase Fitness Center,
listing purchase prices on date of purchase
(cf. table on page 29 of brief)

t?Cy tt^L^Uc^

Addendum C
Defendant's Exhibit D-1:
Requisition forms, purchase orders, invoices, receipts, and checks
reflecting purchase prices and dates of purchase for the surveillance equipment

REQUISITION
OAJ^qf*£QUisii£*r

AC00Uf4I

august i0# &9S

WIIAAAPB

Public Safety T&slclFQarae Aoency

REQUlSmON NO.

7640252.

f

DEPT*EAD

1

L

Keyhole Camera and A c c e s s o r i e s
J

3

EQUIPMENT

OATE ENCUMBERED

ESTIMATED
UNIT PRICE

OESCpPTION

1

2

8057
SUPPLIES

\INIT

$UANT4rt

O NUMBER

'Garth Wilkinson

COUNCILMAN OAAOM^ISTRATOR.

• HEW <
NO "

22501

,

ESTIMATED
AMOUNT'

$1595.02

1 Camera tfcdel #0C-5
l e n s 6-12 1.4VGE

4

i

5

Lens H0425
Monitor FDM-402A

6

^o^l

7

zLfcteYof

'•///«£

JS?S.Ol-

8
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Beexpliat Give accurate descriptions
Use catalog references whenever possible
Give NAME ond ADDRESS of vendor

Allow sufficient time for requisition to be properly processed
Copies \t 3 purchasing; copy 2 depoTlmenl

Vendor Number

Authorized

Skaggs Telecomttmicatira Service 9 Inc,

Recorder m

Proposed Vendor

5290 South Main S t r e e t

Murray, Utah 84107-9797

ftgnc^r^^^t^S

City Manager
Controller

6 ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^

- ^ r <S^^gg^

.

NO ONE IS AUTHORIZED TO BUY WITHOUT A PURCHASE ORDER

DEPARTMENT. FILE

PURCHASE ;opDJR]j

omU

DELIVERY DATE REQUESTED
ITEM -QUANTITY

UNIT

COMMODITIES OR SERVICES FURNISHED MUST CONFORM EXACTLY T O SPECIFICATIONS

ea

AMOUNT

U N I T PRICE

DESCRIPTION

'F.O.B. UNLESS
OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

Keyhold Camera and Accessories

$1,595*02

Camera Model # C O !
Lens 6-12 1.4VGE
Lens H0425
Monitor FDM-402A

• ^ C S •O*-^

CONFIRMATION
s

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIs u h u t R GIVING COST AND DELIVERY DATE
ADDRESS ANY INQUIRIES REGARDING THIS ORDER TO:
Qmp'Tn^^
a m p i v-JffiP!R^-!SM^CEDAii CITY, UTAH

um^?&*&&&r

PHONE: AX. 801
586-2950 *"*

Garth Wilkinson

ACCOUNTS PAYABLE P.O. SOX 24»
: CEOAR CITY, UTAH 84720 * * ^ *

INVOIcf'Tb:

&^W$&&R

ACCOUNT CODES

|

COST CODE

P.O. ISSUEO

KP

P.O. PAID

INVOICE PAID

KP

>VO. • OR OATE

|

STATE OF UTAH SALES OR USE TAX
EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE
*>
I hereby certify thtt commodities included In
this order .will be used in an essential
governmental function and are exempt from
State of Utah Sales and Use Taxes.
Exemption No. 5440110039
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION

7fiA0?«>?

C4TY MANAGER

DEPARTMENT COPY

BY.
pdRCHASlNG A O t N T

^

INVOICE
Skaggs Telecommunications Service
5290 Sou* M«n
Murray. Utth 84107
Pho^^WM^-4400
FAX (801) 261-1580

BILL TO

INVOICE

NUMBER95-547292

P.O Box 57560
Murray. UUh 84157

CUSTOMER NO 4 7 2 4 7 6
PAGENO.l OF 1

IRON/BEAVER DRIG TASK FORCE
BOX 861
CEDAR CITY, W 8 4 7 2 0
801/586-2651

SAME

USA

111/13/95

SALES CODE

REFERENCE

ORDER DATE

58968

1/01/95

BUF-

MODEL

MAKE

-RE

MOBILE NO.

REQUIRED

/

EMP.

TECH

TQ

EST TIME

SS

1

SERIAL NUMBER

ZONE

TIME LOC.

/

VEHICLE ID

RELEASED

COMPLETE

111/13/95-09; 22

FAILURE CODE

Net 30 Days

Origin

Best Way

Merbal

PAYMENT TERMS

FOB.

SHIP VIA

PURCHASE ORDER/CONTRACT NO.

TIME

DATE

SHIP TO:

DATE

SERIAL NUMBER

/

/

MAKE

STATUS

EP

STATUS

EP

-

MODEL

THIS ORDER WAS SIGNED FOR BY GARTO WILKINSON ON 10-20-95

, QUANTITY
REQUIRED!

-DETAIL

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

CC-5
6-12 1.4VGE
H0425
FDM-402A
2XHE
VCM-612MS
91031
91032
0SD400
15375
DCC-120A
AV-40U
270-1544
YA-NP712

Thanks for your business.

&

DESCRIPTION

f.

m.i'.wi'i^HirMiEsai

CAMERA, 1/2" HIGH RES.
527890
LENS, 6-12mm VARIABLE FOCAL AUTO-IRIS
LENS, COMPUTAR 4.0MM MAN
A0259
MONITOR, 4" FLAT DISPLAY
A0260
ADAPTER, 2X LENS
CABLE, UNIVERSAL ADAPTER (FDM-402A)
MOUNT, MAGNET BASE FLEX
MOUNT, SPRING CLIP BASE
DETECTOR, SMOKE DETECTOR CAMERA FIX
IWEKTER AC/DC 125 WATTS
CABLE, AUTO POWER ADAPTER
CABLE, AC ADAPTER FOR (FDM-402A)
ADAPTER, 3 OUTLET FOR AUTO
BATTERY, NP7-12 12V 7AH

BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF
BJF

298.33
198.46
313.69
289.54
65.00
13.33
61.53
61.53
66.80
93. 94
43.50
46.15
16.58
26.64

298.33
198.46'
313.69
289.54
65.00
13.33
61.53
61.53
66.80
93.94
43.50
46.15
16.58
26.64

Taxable
Non Taxable
Tax(6.125%)
Sale Tx Labr

1,595.02
0.00

Total

1.692.72

0.00

REMITTANCE

CCSH^II

CJ ft K

INVOICE

PAYMENT |

INVOICE J PAYMENT J

Skaggs Telecommunications Service
5290 South Main • P.O. Box 57560
Murray, Utan 84)07 • San LaHa C*y. Utah 84157
Phone (801) 261-4400

_.,. T f )
BILL IU

IRON/GARFIELD CQUNTYS NARCOTICS
TftSK

FQRCE

P 0 BOX 861
CEDAR CITY, LIT 84721-0961
. 8 0 1 / 5 8 6 - 2 6 5 1 USA

ACCOUNT NO.
1 472476

1 ACCOUNT NO.
J

572476
DATE

DATE

AMOUNT DUE AMOUNT PAID

PAGES

11 ' 2 1 / 9 5

1 OF 1

DATE ~]
i 1/21/95

1692.72

Skaggs Telecommunications Service

1

5290 Sooth Mam . P.O Boi 57560
Murray Utah 64107 • Sail Lake City. Utah 64157
Phone (801) 261-4400

P.O./CONTRACT NUMBER

INVOICE

STATEMENT

REFERENCE

CHARGES

PAYMENTS

BALANCE

*** PAYMENTS ***
OPEN INVOICES **••
A5S963

.••sfi.«l

CURRENT

30 Days

60 Davs

«0 Devs

0. 00

0. 00

0,00

IF YQU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ON SERV
DP BILLING CALL
284-4765
ON PAST DUE ACCOUNTS CALL DIANN AT

1692.72

120 Days

f/MMf YOU FOR PAYING PROMPTLY
t . 5 0 0 % per Month Will Be
Added To Unoaid Amounts

LATE CHARGES

AMOUNT DUE

DATE PAID

AMOUNT PAID

fiEQUISmON
OATEOf REQUISITION

ACCOUNT

November 29

NUMBER:

;*? 95]

DEPAKTM^T

f 0

DEPT HEAD

[

1

'|

-QUANTITY

1

2

i

3

i

|

NUMBER

Garcn wiiKinson

Public Safety Task Force Agency
COUNCILMAN COADMINISTRATOR

ITEM
NO

22516

REQUISITION NO.

7640252

8057
EQUIPMENT

SUPPLIES

ESTIMATED
UNIT PRICE

"tjfSCTlPTION*

"UNIT

OATEENCUMSEREO

,

ESTIMATED
AMOUNT

40.92

Box; Breakout Audio/Video Power

7.25

: Cable,'12" Pigtail for Sony (sale oonn)
Cable, 12* Pigtail for Sony (Fenale Conn)

7.25

4

$55.42

5

•c^U.

6

cl#

'-V/JAT
6>Y/Y

.1

*SSVQ~

7 !

8
1.
2.
3.

Be explicit Give accurate descriptions
Use catalog references whenever possible
Give NAME and ADDRESS of vendor

Proposed Vendor

Vendor Number.

4.

Allow sufficient time for requisition to be properly processed

5.

Copies 1, 3 purchasing; copy 2 department

Authorized £. a nnt.,r»>4at>fc^( , UJ-olAao^^

Skaggs Telecxatminication Service, Inc.

Recorder

5290 South Main S t r e e t

City Manager

Murray, Utah 84107-9797

Controller

NO ONE IS AUTHORIZED TO BUY WITHOUT A PURCHASE ORDER

DEPARTMENT FILE

£

SALES / SERVICE ORDER
Skaggs Telecommunications Service
8290 Soutt Main
Muray. Utah 84107
flhona (801) 261-4400

BILLTO:

SO NUMBER

95-5^76*

PX>.BOK57560
Murray. Utah 84157

CUSTOMER NO.
PAGE NO.

*1W WMW hfVW&M

PPW-/W&//
PWWP/WAP/?^//

4714781
1 OF I

Iron/Garfiel<§ H .P?c£Cotics Task Force

P.O. Box 861
Cedar C i t y , UT 84720

SAME

801/586-9445

mmshje^m. vmsimstsBk ^3ae5^iSRSii^S^^»J^^5^6i^iS^^
10:05
Quote ft 8006
I 10/25/95
@KS5l$$?g*3& &£&&*£&&!Ms^&om
10/25/95
BJF8006
i

B e s t Way

,V;'i, r.^F.O.B;*::«S4

C. 0 . 0 .
*^lSffl^ffl§E?MSI

• ; / . RELEASED •.•/.•..•:

'.. ;STAT0Sf. •M&S&gL

i

pS$Si&3gg^ mmmmm «&7i@Bi{M*i$&i m&tf&M&m W^6m\£rE^'<--

11

7? j :

ft'xFA^^

*>¥t&jtomsta&8&m

":.. i^-^-ZONE-":--'^^

mmmmm •m^^mt^.
:
SHOP

Origin

-

':'"• MAKE

/_../__-_

STATUS

MODEL

>•£&&

"!V-,,'',A*T.',.'<i ;

QUANTITY ,g
^TEM/FIXCODE
REQUIRED! BO.
1 BB-442
1

1 VK-1PG
1 VK-1PG

DESCRIPTION
•rx^v&'Vdw.jz&'y
DETAIL
f >*-r*r?. I SERIAL NUMBER/* -1EIUIP

^ BOX, BREAKOUT AU0I0/VIDE0/P0WER
BJF
/» CABLE, 12" PIGTAIL FOR SONY (male conn. BJF
if CABLE, 12" PIGTAIL FOR S0NY(female conn BJF
Al when o r d e r i n g t h e v k - l p g you have to
s p e c i f y male or female c o n n e c t o r s .
For t h i s order we need one of each.

PRICE
40.92
7.25
7.2 b

Taxable
Thanks f o r your

business.

YOUR SIGNATURE S AN OFFER TO PURCHASE f » produces m o w aarvfeas iflad aDova a r t * . If aecaplad by STS. tic.. « • ba a purchaaa
eontad « • r » larma and oondriore on t* m n e haraol hobdhg warranty M m n and imttoom of STS, h e iabiity » * adowrtarjgad
t u l anyarjipmart M l o w rimy dayi torn dawof raparnxinylatonandeuaBmarnooftcjton may bi«otdBcoxr 1 » coasof aMdrapaira
and pans. Baton agrwig, pjaaaa faad Via tarma and condNona at iflad on tw lawaiM haraof and any appicBbHj warrinbat and loanaat.

Non
Tax

v.M^tt^^a^*,-^gCTENDED
^F^*RICE ^
40.Sj
7.2

55.4:

o.d

O.dt

^aemt

FUND

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION

01-68

2SJ

P.O. BOX 249 . 801-686-2950
CEDAR CITY, UT 84721

CEDAR CTTY OFFICE • TEL. 5664456

j h STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH
S H

C.EC»AR;.pl7V
CORPORATION

P.O. BOX 340 • CEDAR CTTY. UTAH W721-0340

6413
I7-177/U43

SAWQQCTS

PAY

r
TO
THE
ORDER
OF

n
STATE OF UTAH - ITS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
State Office Building, Room 6000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1170

ifoo&uian1

1:121*30177^1: 0

DATE

12/13/95

AMOUNT

$25-00

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS WARRANT
VARRANTB"6 ISSUED
AOOORDNG TO LAW AND 6 WITHN THE DEBfT UMTT
OF CEDAR OTY.UTAH

iqai?&

FUbLiC SAFETY TASK FORCE
FUND

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION

01-88

CEOAR CTTY OFFICE • TEL. 5864456

STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH

P.O. BOX 249 801-586-2950
CEDAR CITY, UT 84721

P.O. BOX 540 • CEOAR CTTY, UTAH 64721-0340

17-177/1243

&%%$&»&§§ AW42CTS
COR
PAY

rSKAGGS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TO
THE
ORDIR

OF

5290 South Main Street
Murray, Utah 84107

DATE

SERVICE

6414 !

AMOUNT

I HERE^/CERTVY & A T THIS WARRAOTBT&UQ)
ACCORDING TO LAW AND IS WITHIN THE DEBfT LMT
OF CEDAR CTTY. UTAH

tEQUISITION
[DATE Of REQUISITION

J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1989

ACCOUNT
NUMBER „

19

DEPART MENT

I

REQUISITION NO.

M0>.^

76-4212-740

9.0. NUMBER

D€PT. HEAD

Public Safety Task Force Agency

Garth VJilfcinson

QUANTITY

UNIT

1

6600
SUPPLIES

COUNOlMAN OR ADMINISTRATOR

ITEM
NO.

10701

EQUIPMENT

DATE ENCUMBERED

ESTIMATED
UNIT PRICE

DESCRIPTION

|

ESTIMATED
AMOUNT

1

1

Toshiba* VCR

288.00

2

1

Samsung 13 M C o l o r TV

144.95

3
4
5

0 / w X */W-pf
V

6

*

ti^sf

7
8
1.
2.
3.

Be explicit. Give accurate descriptions
Use catalog references whenever possible
Give NAME and ADDRESS of vendor

Proposed Vendor

Vendor Number

4.
5.

Allow sufficient time for requisition to be properly processes
Copies 1, 3 purchasing; copy 2 department

Authorized Signature

^J&-*&^tZfcj

Inkley*s

Recorder

162 N. Main Street

City AAanagec<£^£2^L

Cedar City, Utah 04720

Controller

\ f f l ^ U v Q J

A^^^^W**-*^''JfiU*

NO ONE IS AUTHORIZED TO BUY W I T H O U T A PURCHASE ORDER

DEPARTMENT FILE

DI13

SALT LAKE CITY • COTTONWOOD • SANDY • MIOVALE • BOUNTIFUL • LAYTON • ROY • RIVEROALE • OGOEN • LOGAN • ST. GEORGE • VERNAL • PRICE • CEDAR CITY
PRESTON • POCATELLO • BLACK FOOT • IDAHO FALLS - TWIN FALLS * BURLEY • REXBURG - ROCK SPRINGS • EVANSTON • ELKO
( MAIN OFFICE: 1984 SO. STATE ST. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64115 » (SOI) 486-5901")

SOLD

{

C

t' /

/

' .

\

%£7?l

<

J

i

B,LL

^

ADDRESS

_

_

_

_

_

PHONE.
ACCOUNT NUMBER

P.O. #

INVOICE

AUTHORIZATION

^^oo

:

^«3iiACrNMikaEii;;^^pQ^^

NUMBER

DATE

INVOICE NUMBER

1.«HR9OTM.';

SKU#

f - / ^- •
CLASS

DEP.

I SLSPN'S NO.^

/-r/
-L.
QY.

-V—
AMOUNT

/
j> r>,-^_.

i

C O N D I T I O N OF SALE: TITLE TC MERCHANDISE HEREIN REMAINS WITH THE SELLER
UNTIL ACCOUNT PAID IN FULL IF COLLECTION IS MADE BY SUIT OR OTHERWISE THE
PURCHASER AGREES TO PAY INTEREST UNTIL PAID IN FULL ALSO COLLECTION COST
INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE
FINANCE CHARGE: If a F-nance Charge <s due i.s you sha» pay FINANCE CHARGE of 1.75H
per mcnih (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE: 21°*) on the balance of your account dur-ng the billing
perioc as descnbec below A minimum monthly FINANCE CHARGE cf 50c wii be charged any
month >n wh<ch the balance »s 'ess than S28.85.

SALES
TAX

TOTAL
>

^ill ,/

•

YOUR BUSINESS IS APPRECIATED

<

•
^ ]

I N K L E Y S C E D ATR

CITY

162N.MAIN £ . 3
HONE 536-9963

31/13/89 TICKET# 38-1952 SLSMN 1 1
BUSINESS CHARGE SALE
274596
144.95 MERCHDISE
2756.15 v» c a
288.06 MERCHD! SE
.30 TAX
432.95 TOTAL SALE
ACCOUNT #166302

THANK

YOU «

PURCHASE ORDER

PURCHASE ORDER

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION
P.O. BOX 249
CEDAR CITY, UTAH 84720

January 23, 1989

DATE:.

No. 006600

• MUST SHOW ON ALL INVOICES
DELIVERY TO BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH

INQUIRY NO.

19.

m?m

REQUISITION N O . .

INSTRUCTIONS TO VENDOR

r

1. INVOICING:

INKLEY'S

INVOICES MUST BE RENDERED IN DUPLICATE for tech ord»f
•nd lent to the ACCOUNTS PAYABLE.

162 N. Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720

REFERENCE: PURCHASE tORDER ^NUMBER sMJST
~***N VOICES, p*cfc«9«s, tfrtt «y «Bp» end corrtspotMfeoce.
3. PREPAY AND ADD TO INVOICE.

VENDOR NO.
4. For local pickups obtain signature ol receiver on invoice.

DELIVER TO .
SHIP VIA

TERMS:

DELIVERY DATE REQUESTED.
ITEM

QUANTITY

UNIT

UNIT PRICE

DESCRIPTION
COMMODITIES OR SERVICES FURNISHED MUST CONFORM EXACTLY TO SPECIFICATIONS

AMOUNT

F.O.B. UNLESS
OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

$288.00

1

1

Toshiba VCR

2

1

Samsung 13" Color TV

144.95

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER GIVING COST AND DELIVERY DATE
ADDRESS ANY INQUIRIES REGARDING THIS ORDER TO:
UBUC WORKS COMPLEX • A I R P O R T ROAD
DAR C4TV.4JTAH 84720 -

SHIPTO:-

PHONE: A C . M l
586-6514

6afth WilkinSOB

INVOICE TO:

wms^&Mm

COUNTS PAYABLE P.O. BOK 249
EDAll CITY, U T A H 9*12X> r

ACCOUNT CODES
1

COST COOE

PO ISSUED

KP

P O PAID

INVOICE PAID

KP

VO. • OH DATE

7fi-A?12-740

CITY MANAGER

DEPARTMENT COPY

STATE OF UTAH SALES OR USE TAX
EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that commodities included in
this order will be used in an essential
governmental function and are exempt from
State of Utah Sales and Use Taxes.
Exemption No. 5440110039
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION

BT.
PURCHASING AGENT

